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THE OLD MONTANA DILEMMA AND THE NEW
APPROACH TO LARCENY BY TRICK AND OBTAINING
GOODS BY FALSE PRETENSES
Joel E. Guthals
INTRODUCTION
Before opening a law book, almost everyone appreciates what
"theft" means. But as most lawyers know only too well, the law which
has been developed to deal with the crime is far from simple. This
note examines the complexities and inconsistencies which have occurred
with regard to two of the more ingenious forms of stealing: larceny
by trick and obtaining property by false pretenses. Because many of
these problems are rooted in antiquity, the analysis beings with a dis-
cussion of the common law approach. As the old law was codified and
interpreted, new problems were created. These difficulties are discussed
with emphasis on the unique and somewhat confusing changes in the
law which appear in the Montana cases. Fortunately, most of these
problems have been solved by the Montana Criminal Code.' The new
provisions are discussed in light of their objectives and the experience
of other states with similar statutes. Hopefully, through examining
the many problems which have occurred concerning larceny by trick
and false pretenses, the bar will be encouraged to ensure that "theft"
reacquires a simple meaning which both lawyers and laymen can under-
stand.
THE COMMON LAW
(A) SIMPLE LARCENY
Considering the historical prevalence of larceny, it is not surprising
that the common law developed an early and harsh solution to the
problem of theft. As defined by Blackstone, larceny consisted of "the
felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another."
2
While this definition became the subject of much interpretation, the
primary elements of the crime were (1) a trespassory taking, that is,
a taking by force and violence, and (2) a mens rea, usually defined as
an existing intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession.8 The
penalty for larceny was death-a straightforward approach which should
have deterred virtually anyone who planned any form of theft.
'Laws of Montana (1973), C. 513, See. 1 (MONTANA CRIMINAL CODE OF 1973, Title 94,
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947), Effective Jan. 1, 1974) [hereinafter cited as
M.C.C. 1973].
24 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 230-231; an even earlier treatment of the offense
may be found in STAUNFORD, LES PLES DEL CORON 24-30 (1583).
"For a complete analysis of the acquisitive offenses see PERKINs, CRIMINAL LAW,
234-278 (2d Ed. 1972).
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(B) STEALING BY FRAUD
Unfortunately, the law soon encountered difficulties. Larceny, as
defined, contemplated the thief who by audacity or stealth ran off with
his neighbor's possessions without permission. What then became of the
man who, while pretending to borrow a carriage for the day, actually
galloped over the hill never to be seen again? How was the law to treat
the cunning Fagin who enticed his victim to voluntarily give up his
silver for the promise of receiving twice as much on a future day? In
both examples the important element of a trespassory taking is absent.
If the owner willingly parted with his property, the taking could not
be said to have been forceful. The thief who used his brain rather
than his brawn to steal was thus left unpunished.
The law soon dealt with the person who, while intending to per-
manently misappropriate another's goods, fraudulently pretended that
he was borrowing them.4 The courts devised a legal fiction which held
that because the offender had a felonious intent from the outset, he
never acquired possession peaceably. The fraudulent taking was "con-
structive" violence and the committor of the crime, which became known
as larceny by trick, was a trespasser ab initio-from the beginning.5
With the use of the ab initio fiction, the fraudulent borrower could be
punished within the existing larceny law regardless of the intricacy of
the scheme he used.
The case of the "con man" who fraudulently acquired goods by
making false promises to his victim was not so easily solved. Common
law larceny was concerned with the forceful taking of possession.6 While
it might have been convenient to accept the fiction that obtaining posses-
sion by fraud constituted a type of violence, the concept was not ex-
tended to the thief who induced the owner to give up both possession and
title.7 The common law distinguished very sharply between these dif-
ferent interests in property. Title was full and complete ownership.
Possession was something less-the assertion of unqualified custody and
physical control over the property.8 Common law larceny was derived
from ancient trespass actions designed to proscribe the wrongful taking
of possession. If title was passed voluntarily from one person to another,
the taker could not be guilty of larceny because larceny was a crime
against possession. In maintaining this artificial distinction, the courts
reasoned that a thief could not be a trespasser against goods which he
owned through a voluntary transfer of title, regardless of the fraudulent
methods used in acquiring title.9 The courts were rigid in refusing to
'Tunnards Case, 2 East P.C. 687, 688 (1729).
51d. at 688; the first actual use of the term "trespasser ab initio"' was made some
years later in Oxley v. Watts, 1 T.R. 12, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785).
'PERKINS, supra note 2 at 238.
7PERKINS, supra note 2 at 296.
'BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 19-22 (2d Ed. 1955).
'People v. Noblett, 244 N.Y. 355, 155 N.E. 670, 671 (1927).
(Vol. 35
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apply the larcency law to misappropriations of title.'0 Consequently,
legislatures were forced to enact statutes to deal with the offense which
became known as obtaining goods by false pretenses."
As ordinarily defined, false pretenses consisted of "knowingly and
designedly obtaining the property of another by means of an untrue
representation of fact with intent to defraud."' 2 The crime required:
(1) a pre-existing intent to steal, coupled with (2) a misrepresentation
of a past or present fact, relied upon by the victim, and (3) a fraudulently
induced parting of title to the goods from the rightful owner.'
3
The second element of the offense became an essential and distinc-
tive characteristic of false pretenses. The law sought to avoid prose-
cuting unlucky entrepreneurs who, innocent of any wrongful intent,
simply could not produce what they promised. Therefore, if the accused
merely misrepresented a future occurrence without lying about an exist-
ing fact, he could not be convicted of the crime. ' While some argued
that an intentionally false promise was a misrepresentation of an existing
state of mind and thus an untrue representation of a present fact,15
the distinction between false facts and false promises became fixed
in the law.
(C) GROWING COMPLICATIONS
As criminals became increasingly clever, the distinctions which the
courts tried to make between larceny by trick and false pretenses be-
came increasingly advantageous to the thief. Judges attempted to main-
tain larceny by trick as an extension of the old trespass laws by re-
quiring all of the ancient elements. The crime remained one against
possession where a person pretended through a misrepresentation to
take property for a temporary period while his real plan was to perman-
ently deprive the rightful owner of the goods. The victim had to intend
to part only with possession, while the thief had to intend to steal
from the very beginning. Thus, if the prosecution charged larceny by
trick and the victim testified that he intended to give title rather than
possession, the accused could not be convicted. False pretenses was a
crime prohibiting fraudulent schemes to obtain title. If the victim
decided on the stand that he had intended to transfer only possession,
the defendant charged with false pretenses would be acquitted.
Because the distinction between present facts and future promises
existed only in false pretenses, an interesting "loophole" in the law
was created. It was possible for the thief who was clever enough to
'
0PERKINS, supra note 2 at 297.
"The original false pretenses statute was 30 GEO. II, e. 24, See. 1 (1757).
"PERKINS, supra note 2 at 297.
"PERKINS, supra note 2 at 296-319.
"Commonwealth v. Drew, 36 Mass. 179, 185 (1837).
"See, Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray 173, 199 (Mass. 1857).
1974]
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acquire title through a false promise to escape punishment entirely.
His comrade, however, who was so unlucky as to acquire were posses-
sion through a fraudulent promise, could be convicted of larceny by
trick, for in this crime the law did not distinguish between misrepre-
sentations of fact and promise. 10
In its attempts to punish those who stole money rather than tangibles
through fraud, the law became ludicrous. Attorneys debated whether
the victim who was defrauded of his life savings intended to pass title
or just possession. 17 The courts commonly held that if the owner expected
to get back the same coin that he had given, then he had intended to
transfer only possession.' If the owner did not care what money he was
eventually to receive for his "investment," he must have intended to
part with both possession and title. The determination of what prop-
erty interest had been transferred would decide what crime, if any,
could be charged and which elements were necessary for conviction.
Because this determination was so tenuous, attorneys often did not
learn the crime with which they were dealing until the trial court
decision reached the appellate level. Due to procedural requirements,
these appellate rulings often came too late to allow the filing of an
amended pleading. The accused was either set free or his act was
twisted to fit into a related category of larceny, such as embezzlement,
in which a conviction was allowable.19
The artificial distinctions between larceny by trick and false pre-
tenses and the resulting difficulties in applying the law became em-
bedded in the foundations of virtually every enactment dealing with
theft by fraud. Unfortunately these laws, when interpreted by the
Montana courts, became even more complicated and confusing. This
interpretation is examined next.
TIIE MONTANA DILEMMA
(A) STATUTORY FOUNDATION
Eventually, the statutes of many states departed from the common
law definitions of larceny by trick and false pretenses. But the Mon-
tana Codes, 20 although broadening the offenses by encompassing more
types of property interests within their coverage than was contemplated
by the common law, retained the traditional approach and language:
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2701. Larceny defined. Every person who, with
intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of property, or of the
use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of
"
0This 'loophole,'' as explained above, was created to protect entrepreneurs from being
prosecuted for "puffing." See United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir. 1932).
17See Regina v. Davenport, 1 All E.R. 602, 603 (1954).
8Id.
"
9 Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, supra note 15 at 202.
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
[Vol. 35
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the taker, or of any other person .... (1) Takes from the possession
of the true owner, or of any other person; or obtains from such
possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false representation or
pretense, or any false token or writing, or secretes, withholds, or
appropriates to his own use, or that of any other person other than
the true owner, any money, personal property, thing in action,
evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind . . . is
guilty of larceny.'
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1805. Obtaining money, property or services by
false pretenses. Every person who knowingly and designedly, by
false or fradulent representation or pretenses, defrauds any other
person of money or property, including evidence of indebtedness, or
who knowingly and designedly obtains the service of another by
false or fraudulent representation or pretenses, or who causes or
procures others to report falsely of his wealth or mercantile char-
acter, and by this imposing upon any person obtains credit, and there-
by fraudulently receives services or gets into possession of money or
property, is punishable in the same manner and to the same extent
as for larceny of the money or the value of the property or services
so obtained.'
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2701 proscribed simple larceny with the clause
"takes from the possession of the true owner," as well as larceny by
trick by using the language "obtains . . . possession by . . . frauduent
or false representation. . . ." The wording of R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1805
defines the offense of false pretenses: "knowingly and designedly by
false or fraudulent representation or pretense. . . ." Obviously written
to correspond to the traditional elements, the sections were nevertheless
sufficiently ambiguous to create difficulties. The phrase in the larceny
statute, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2701 which spoke of "false representation
or pretense" sounded very much like false pretenses. The clause near
the end of R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1805 which stated ". . . receives possession
of money or property . . ." was closer to larceny than to false pretenses
which historically required the obtainment of title rather than pos-
session. Due to this somewhat confusing wording, wrongdoers were
sometimes charged and convicted under the improper section. When
required to review such convictions, the Montana supreme court chose
a solution which amplified rather than rectified the confusion.
(B) THE CASES
In the somewhat bizarre case of State v. Dickinson,23 the complain-
ing witness, Amanda Gray, approached the defendant believing him
to be one Dr. Veno, a famous physician from Pennsylvania. For the
sum of $87 the defendant guaranteed in writing to cure Mrs. Gray's
daughter of "stiffness of the muscles about the ankle." Unfortunately,
the defendant was not who he claimed and the cure was ineffective.
When Mrs. Gray's money was not returned as promised, the defendant
was charged with larceny by trick-or as the county attorney more
-R.C.M. 1947 § 94-2701 (repealed by Laws of Montana (1973), Ch. 513, See. 32).
originally enacted as MONTANA PENAL CODE OF 1895, § 880.
-R.C.M. 1947 § 94-1805 (repealed by Laws of Montana (1973), Ch. 513, Sec. 32);
originally enacted as MONTANA PENAL CODE OF 1895, § 993.
'State v. Dickinson, 21 Mont. 595, 55 P. 539 (1898).
1974]
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eloquently termed the offense: grand larceny by obtaining money under
false pretenses. The charge was made under Montana Penal Code of
1895, § 880, forerunner of R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2701.
Defendant Dickinson was convicted as charged, but appealed on the
theory that the jury had been improperly instructed as to the property
interests protected by the crime of larceny by trick. The defendant
claimed, quite incorrectly, that the offense with which he was charged
required proof that the complaining witness parted with both possession
and title, rather than with mere possession as the trial court had cor-
rectly instructed. The Montana supreme court, apparently equating
larceny through false pretense (actually larceny by trick) with the
traditional offense of false pretenses, accepted the defendant's analysis.
The court ruled that larceny by trick required proof of a parting of
both possession and title. Even though such proof had been offered
at the trial, due to the trial court's "misdirection in the law" the con-
viction was reversed.24
The result of the Dickinson decision was to erase the distinction
between larceny by trick and false pretenses. In effect, larceny by trick
was eliminated from the statutes since it required the same essential
element as false pretenses-an obtainment of title and possession. Sev-
enty years later, however, a legal resurrection of the old crime seemed
to occur in the holding of the court in the case of State v. Love. 25
The defendant, William Love, describing himself as a used car
dealer, obtained possession of an automobile from the complaining witness
by writing a check for which there were insufficient funds. Evidence
at the trial proved the defendant knew the check to be worthless and
indicated serious doubts as to Mr. Love's status as a reputable car
dealer. The defendant was convicted of obtaining money through false
pretenses under R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1805. The defendant appealed arguing
with the trial court's refusal to instruct that false pretenses required
a showing that both title and possession must pass. The Montana
supreme court rejected this appeal and stated that R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1805
"does not require that title pass, only possession.
26
Since larceny by trick is the traditional offense against possession
and false pretenses ordinarily is applied to acquisitions of title, the
Love decision appeared to reinstate the crime of larceny by trick by
finding the essential elements of the crime within the false pretense
statute. The remainder of the decision, however, specified that false
pretenses, while being an offense against possession, still required the
ancient elements:
21Id. at 541.
"State v. Love, 151 Mont. 190, 440 P.2d 275 (1968).
"Id. at 279.
[Vol. 35
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First, the making by the accused to the person injured of one or
more representations of past events or existing facts; second, that
such injured party believed such representations to be true and
relying thereon, parted with money or property, which was received
by the accused; third, that such representations were false; and
fourth, were made knowingly and designedly, with the intent to
defraud such other person.'
Interestingly, the court, in setting forth these elements, cited the
earlier case of State v. Bratton,25 thus indicating that not only were
the ancient elements of false pretenses still present but the old loophole
as well. For, in Bratton the court had reversed the defendant's con-
viction because the testimony of the complaining witness had indicated
a reliance upon a false promise rather than upon an untrue fact.
29
(C) THE MONTANA DILEMMA
The Dickinson and Love decisions resulted in a unique juxtaposition
of the traditional elements of larceny by trick and obtaining property
by false pretenses. The rulings required that, in seeking to convict
under R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2701 for larceny by trick, the state prove that
the accused utilized fraudulent means to obtain both possession and
title from his victim. The crime of false pretenses necessitated proof
that the victim fraudulently obtained possession (not title) through
an untrue representation of an existing fact upon which the victim
relied.
Not only are these elements departures from the common law from
which they were derived, but in so defining the offenses, the decisions
also created a new dilemma for the law: the clever thief who falsely
promised to return the buggy which he claimed to be borrowing, and
for which the offense of larceny by trick was originally devised, could
continue his fraudulent gallop unhampered. His conduct, which con-
sisted of obtaining mere possession by the making of a fraudulent
promise, was prohibited by neither section 94-2701, larceny by trick,
nor section 94-1805, false pretenses. As provided in the Dickinson and
Love decisions, this theft was beyond the reach of the courts because
the wrongdoer had not misrepresented an existing fact. This loophole,
which was originally created to protect the unlucky businessman who
could not return what he promised, instead could be utilized to insulate
an obvious criminal from punishment.
A NEW APPROACH
(A) THE MONTANA CRIMINAL CODE
Because of the extraordinary confusion which resulted in applying
the common law elements of larceny by trick and false pretenses, the
"Id. at 278.
EState v. Bratton, 56 Mont. 563, 186 P. 327 (1919).
1Id. at 328.
1974]
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Montana Criminal Code abandoned the traditional approach for an
entirely new solution. The applicable portion of the new statute pro-
vides:
(1) A person commits the offense of theft when he purposely or
knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of
the owner, and(a) has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or(b) purposely or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the
property in such manner as to deprive the owner of the property; or(c) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use,
concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the
property.
(2) A person commits the offense of theft when he purposely or
knowingly obtains by threat or deception control over property of
the owner, and:(a) has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or(b) purposely or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the
property in such manner as to deprive the owner of the property, or(c) uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use,
concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the
property.'
The section makes no reference to common law elements or term-
inology. Instead, the statute uses broad but precisely defined terms to
cover the formerly troublesome concepts. The artificial distinction be-
tween title and possession which was used under the traditional approach
to determine which offense, if any, had been committed has been elim-
inated by using the phrase "obtains or exerts control." As defined by
the new Code, this term includes virtually every type of property inter-
est.3 ' Regardless of whether the actor acquires title or possession from
his victim, his conduct is punishable. The problem of determining
whether the item stolen was within the class of property protected by
the law has been solved by the term "property" which is defined as
"anything of value. '3 2 Cumulatively, these new terms ensure that crim-
inal sanctions will be provided for the fraudulent obtainment of any
possible interest in any kind of property.
Subsection (1) is the foundation of the Criminal Code approach to
theft and should prohibit virtually all forms of stealing. The subsection
requires that the prosecution need prove only two elements to sustain
a conviction: (1) that the offender purposely, with some design, or
knowingly, with knowledge of facts and circumstances, obtained un-
authorized control over the property; and (2) that the defendant had
the purpose to deprive.33 Subsections (1) (a), (1) (b), and (1) (c) allow
the second element of the offense to be shown in three ways: (1) by
proof of a purpose to deprive; (2) by implication from the offender's
'-M.C.C. 1973, § 94-6-302.
'0M.C.C. 1973, § 94-2-101(34). "Obtains or exerts control" includes but is not limited
to the taking, carrying away, or the sale, conveyance, or transfer of title to, or interest
in, or possession of property.
-M.O.C. 1973, § 94-2-101(49).
33People v. Jordan, 115 Ill. App.2d 307, 252 N.E.2d 701 (1969); People v. Jackson,
66 Ill. App.2d 276, 214 N.E.2d 316, 318 (1966).
[Vol. 35
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that his activities would deprive the owner of the property. There is
no requirement that the offender intend to permanently deprive the
owner of the goods nor is any distinction made concerning the manner
in which control was obtained.
Subsection (2) prohibits the specific offense of stealing by threat
or deception. While such conduct is effectively prohibited by subsection
(1), the Criminal Law Commission felt that the concise approach taken
by that provision might create problems in application because of the
numerous prior offenses embodied therein.34 To support a conviction
under subsection (2), the prosecution must prove that: (1) the prop-
erty was acquired either purposely or knowingly by use of threat or
deception, and (2) the defendant had the purpose to deprive which
may be shown by direct proof or implication. "Deception," as defined
by the new Code, includes any knowingly false misrepresentation or
promise.3 5 The term thus eliminates the distinction between representa-
tions of past, present, and future facts which plagued the prior law on
false pretenses and larceny by trick.
From an examination of the statute, it may be concluded that the
old problems which encumbered the prior law have been eliminated. By
specifically avoiding reference to prior law and instead using new and
carefully defined terminology, the section represents a considerable
simplification of and improvement to the traditional approach.
(B) COURT INTERPRETATIONS
The wording for the new section on theft has been taken without
substantial change from the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961.36 A con-
siderable number of cases have dealt with the substantive provisions
and key definitions of the statute. Fortunately, as noted below, these
T MORIMINAL LAW COMMISSION COMMENT, REVISED PROPOSED MONTANA CRIMINAL COD
(1973), § 94-6-302.
8M.C.C. 1973, § 94-2-101(11). "Deception" means knowingly to:
(a) create or confirm in another an impression which is false and which the
offender does not believe to be true; or
(b) fail to correct a false impression which the offender previously has created
or confirmed; or
(c) prevent another from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition of
the property involved; or
(d) sell or otherwise transfer or encumber property, failing to disclose a lien,
adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether
such impediment is or is not of value or is not a matter of official record; or
(e) promise performance which the offender does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed. Failure to perform standing alone is not evidence
that the offender did not intend to perform."
'The source of the Montana statute is ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES, Ch. 38, § 16-1. The
primary change made by the Montana Criminal Law Commission is the use of the
words "purposely" and "knowingly" in place of the Illinois section's use of the
traditional term "intent" to define the required inens rea. "Intent" was well to be
rid of considering the voluminous interpretations which surrounded the word.
NOTES19741
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decisions have indicated that the language used in subsections (1) and
(2) means precisely what it seems to say.
In applying the terminology of the section to specific factual cir-
cumstances, the Illinois courts have generally held that the statute is
broad enough to encompass practically all conceivable forms of theft
and all types of fraudulent acquisitions of property interests. The terms
"unauthorized control" and "owner" have been held to be sufficiently
definite to be constitutionally valid.3 7 Numerous decisions have indi-
cated that any possessory interest is sufficient to make a person an
owner and thus make the offender who obtains such interest an exerter
of "unauthorized control," in order to sustain a conviction. 38 The defini-
tion of deception has been ruled to include false promises of future pay-
ments.39 And in regard to the sometime difficult task of proving the
mental states required by the statute, the courts have shown latitude
in permitting facts and circumstances surrounding the act to be ad-
mitted to provide inferences of the wrongdoer's culpability. 40 In all,
the section has been quite successfully applied to criminal conduct and
has met most challenges.
(C) APPLICATION IN MONTANA
The Illinois decisions, of course, are only persuasive authority in
Montana. In light of the confusion spawned by attempting to apply
the common law foundations to the prior Montana statutes on larceny
by trick and false pretenses, it is reasonable to expect that the Montana
bench and bar will seek to follow the straightforward approach estab-
lished by Illinois. The experience of California, which earlier sought
to consolidate the theft-related offenses, may be instructive. Because
the California statute made a passing reference to the traditional names
of the offenses, lawyers were able to convince the courts that the ancient
elements of the crimes were to be applied to the new statute.4' Thus,
the forward step taken by the California legislature was invalidated.
The Illinois decisions, on the contrary, have been careful to uphold the
intent of the Illinois drafters.
The Montana statute avoids any reference to the common law. In-
stead, M.C.C. 1973, § 94-6-302 provides a simplified approach to theft
"People v. Hardin, 42 Ill.2d 301, 247 N.E.2d 404, 406 (1969); People v. Cleveland,
104 Ill. App.2d 415, 244 N.E.2d 212, 214 cert. denied 90 S.Ct. 479; People v. Kamsler,
78 Ill. App.2d 349, 223 N.E.2d 237 (1966).
"For example, in People v. Smith, 90 Ill. App.2d 388, 234 N.E.2d 161, 166 (1967), the
manager of a hotel was held to have sufficient control over the hotel's property to
be an "owner" as required by the section. Similarly, the payee of a stolen check
was held to have had adequate interest in the check and the proceeds therefrom to
meet the requirements of an "owner.'' People v. Jones, 123 Ill. App.2d 389, 259
N.E.2d 393 (1970).
BPeople v. Kamsler, supra note 37 at 237.
t 0People v. McClinton, 4 Ill. App.3d 253, 280 N.E.2d 795, 798 (1972); People v. Bixler,
49 Ill.2d 328, 275 N.E.2d 392, 396 (1971) cert. denied 405 U.S. 1066.
"People v. Kassab, 219 C.A.2d 687, 33 Cal. Rptr. 494, 496 (1963).
[Vol. 35
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which should make the law understandable both to the bar and to
citizens who are expected to obey and support it. The new section
must remain unencumbered by intricate interpretations in order to meet
the statute's objective: to deter and punish the crime of theft, regardless
of the ingenuity of the offender.
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